| Internet-Draft | DET in DNS | December 2024 |
| Wiethuechter & Reid | Expires 15 June 2025 | [Page] |
This document describes the discovery and management of DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) in DNS. Authoritative Name Servers, with DRIP specific DNS structures and standard DNS methods, are the Public Information Registries for DETs and their related metadata.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 June 2025.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Registries are fundamental to Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote Identification (RID). Only very limited operational information can be sent via Broadcast RID, but extended information is sometimes needed. The most essential element of information from RID is the UAS ID, the unique key for lookup of extended information in relevant registries (see Figure 4 of [RFC9434]).¶
When a DRIP Entity Tag (DET) [RFC9374] is used as the UAS ID in RID, extended information can be retrieved from a DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME) which manages registration of and associated lookups from DETs. In this document we assume the DIME is a function of UAS Service Suppliers (USS) (Appendix A.2 of [RFC9434]) but a DIME can be independent or handled by another entity as well.¶
DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) embedded a hierarchy scheme which is mapped onto the Domain Name System (DNS). DIME's enforce registration and information access of data associated with a DET while also providing the trust inherited from being a member of the hierarchy. Other identifiers and their methods are out of scope for this document.¶
Authoritative Name Servers of the Domain Name System (DNS) provide the Public Information such as the cryptographic keys, endorsements and certificates of DETs and pointers to Private Information resources. Cryptographic (public) keys are used to authenticate anything signed by a DET, such as in the Authentication defined [RFC9575] for Broadcast RID. Endorsements and certificates are used to endorse the claim of being part of the hierarchy.¶
Aspects of Private Information Registries to store and protect, through AAA mechanisms, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) are not described in this document.¶
DRIP relies on the DNS and as such roughly follows the registrant-registrar-registry model. In DRIP, the registrant would be the end user who owns/controls the Unmanned Aircraft. They are ultimately responsible for the DET and any other information that gets published in the DNS. Registrants use agents known as registrars to manage their interactions with the registry. Registrars typically provide optional additional services such as DNS hosting.¶
The registry maintains a database of the registered domain names and their related metadata such as the contact details for domain name holder and the relevant registrar. The registry provides DNS service for the zone apex which contains delegation information for domain names. Registries generally provide services such as WHOIS or RDAP to publish metadata about the registered domain names and their registrants and registrars.¶
Registrants have contracts with registrars who in turn have contracts with registries. Payments follow this model too: the registrant buys services from a registrar who pays for services provided by the registry.¶
By definition, there can only be one registry for a domain name. Since that registry is a de facto monopoly, the scope of its activities are usually kept to a minimum to reduce the potential for market distortions or anti-competitive practices. A registry can have an arbitrary number of registrars who compete with each other on price, service and customer support.¶
It is not necessary, and in some case may not be desirable, for DRIP registrations to strictly follow this registrant-registrar-registry model. Prevailing circumstances and/or local policy may mean some combination of these roles could be combined. A DRIP registry might be operated by the CAA. Or it could be outsourced to a DNS registry provider. Registration policies - pricing, renewals, registrar and registrant agreements, etc. - will need to be developed. These considerations should be determined by the CAA, perhaps in consultation with local stakeholders. They are are out of scope for this document.¶
The specifics for the UAS RID use case are detailed in the rest of document.¶
The scope of this document is limited to the 2001:30::/28 IPv6 prefix and its associated reverse domain in DNS. The use case of DETs for UAS RID was the primary driver for the technology (and this document), as such requirements of other sectors or use cases are unknown at the time of publication.¶
Other sectors may adopt this technology. It is recommended that a global Apex (i.e. IPv6 prefix) and international Apex manager be designated for each sector.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
[RFC9374] defines the Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT) and further specifies an instance of them used for UAS RID called DETs. The HHIT is a 128-bit value that is as an IPv6 address intended primarily as an identifier rather than locator. It's format is in Figure 1, shown here for reference, and further information is in [RFC9374].¶
+-------------+--------------+---------------+-------------+
| IPv6 Prefix | Hierarchy ID | HHIT Suite ID | ORCHID Hash |
| (28-bits) | (28-bits) | (8-bits) | (64-bits) |
+-------------+--------------+---------------+-------------+
/ \
/ \
/ \-----------------------------\
/ \
/ \
+--------------------------------+-----------------------+
| Registered Assigning Authority | HHIT Domain Authority |
| (14-bits) | (14-bits) |
+--------------------------------+-----------------------+
The IPv6 Prefix, assigned by IANA for DETs is 2001:30::/28. The corresponding domain (nibble reversed as 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa) is owned by the IAB.¶
Due to the nature of the hierarchy split and its relationship to nibble reversing of the IPv6 address, the upper level of hierarchy (i.e. RAAs) "borrows" the upper two bits of their respective HDA space for DNS delegation. As such the IPv6 prefix of RAAs are 2001:3x:xxx::/44 and HDAs are 2001:3x:xxxy:yy::/56 with respective nibble reverse domains of x.x.x.x.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa and y.y.y.x.x.x.x.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.¶
A subset of RAAs have preallocations based on the ISO 3166-1 Numeric Nation Code [ISO3166-1]. This is to support the initial use case of DETs in UAS RID on an international level. See Section 6.2.1 for the RAA allocations.¶
The HDA values of 0, 4096, 8192 and 12288 are reserved for operational use of an RAA (a by-product of the above mentioned borrowing of bits), specifically when to register with the Apex and endorse delegations of HDAs in their namespace.¶
The administration, management and policy for operation a DIME at any level in the hierarchy (Apex, RAA or HDA), be it external or from a parent level, is out of scope for this document. In some cases, such as the RAAs and HDAs of a nation, these are National Matters which are to be dealt with by those parties accordingly.¶
Per [RFC9434] all information classified, by all parties involved, as public is stored in the DNS, specifically Authoritative Name Servers, to satisfy REG-1 from [RFC9153].¶
Authoritative Name Servers use domain names as handles and data is stored in Resource Records (RR) with associated RRTypes. This document defines two new RRTypes, one for HHIT metadata (HHIT, Section 5.1) and another for UAS Broadcast RID information (BRID, Section 5.2). The former RRType is particularly important as it contains a URI (as part of the certificate) that point to Private Information resources.¶
DETs, being IPv6 addresses, are to be under ip6.arpa (nibble reversed per convention) with at minimum an HHIT RRType. Depending on local circumstances or additional use cases other RRTypes MAY be present. For UAS RID the BRID RRType MUST be present to provide the Broadcast Endorsements defined in [RFC9575].¶
DNSSEC is strongly RECOMMENDED (especially for RAA-level and higher zones). When a DIME decides to use DNSSEC they SHOULD define a framework for cryptographic algorithms and key management [RFC6841]. This may be influenced by frequency of updates, size of the zone, and policies.¶
UAS specific information, such as physical characteristics, MAY also be stored in DNS but is out of scope for this document. This specification information is currently drafted in [uas-sn-dns].¶
Lookups of the above RRTypes are performed with the standard DNS methodology using the nibble reversed DET as the query name affixed to the ip6.arpa domain apex and asking for the specific RRType. The HHIT RRType provides the public key for signature verification and URIs via the certificate. The BRID RRType provides static Broadcast RID information such as the Broadcast Endorsements sent following [RFC9575].¶
The HHIT Resource Record is a metadata record for various bits of HHIT specific information that isn't available in the pre-existing HIP RRType. It does not replace the HIP RRType. The primary advantage of this RRType over the existing RRType is the inclusion a certificate containing an entity's public key signed by the registrar, or other trust anchor, to confirm registration.¶
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HHIT Data Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. HHIT Data (CBOR Encoded) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The HHIT Data Length is 32-bit integer representing the number of bytes contained in the HHIT Data field. The HHIT Data field MUST be encoded in CBOR bytes. The CDDL of the HHIT Data is provided in Figure 3.¶
The HHIT Data is represented in base64 and may be divided into any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to single base64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full object. These substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. Note that the HHIT Data portion has internal subfields, but these do not appear in the master file representation only a single logical base64 string will appear. The HHIT Data Length is not represented as it is implicitly known by the HHIT Data.¶
The HHIT Data portion MAY, for display purposes only, be represented using the Extended Diagnostic Notation as defined in Appendix G of [RFC8610].¶
hhit-rr = [
type: uint .size(2),
abbreviation: tstr .size(15),
registration-cert: bstr / #6.TBD
]
This field is two octets with values defined in Section 6.2.2. It is envisioned that there may be many types of HHITs in use. In some cases it may be helpful to understand the HHITs role in the ecosystem like described in [drip-dki]. This field provides such context.¶
This field is meant to provide an abbreviation to the HID structure for display devices. The specific contents of this field are not defined here.¶
This field is reserved for any certificate to endorse registration that contains the DET. It MUST be encoded as X.509 DER or C.509 [cbor-x509]. This certificate MAY be self-signed when the entity is acting as a root of trust (i.e. an apex). Such self-signed behavior is defined by policy, such as in [drip-dki], and is out of scope for this document.¶
The UAS Broadcast RID Resource Record type (BRID) is a format to hold public information typically sent of the UAS Broadcast RID that is static. It can act as a data source if information is not received over Broadcast RID or for cross validation. The primary function for DRIP is the inclusion of one or more Broadcast Endorsements as defined in [RFC9575] in the auth field. These Endorsements are generated by the registrar upon successful registration and broadcast by the entity.¶
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| BRID Data Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. BRID Data (CBOR Encoded) .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The BRID Data Length is 32-bit integer representing the number of bytes contained in the BRID Data field. The BRID Data field MUST be encoded in CBOR bytes. The CDDL of the BRID Data is provided in Figure 5.¶
The BRID Data is represented in base64 and may be divided into any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to single base64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full object. These substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. Note that the BRID Data portion has internal subfields, but these do not appear in the master file representation only a single logical base64 string will appear. The BRID Data Length is not represented as it is implicitly known by the BRID Data.¶
The BRID Data portion MAY, for display purposes only, be represented using the Extended Diagnostic Notation as defined in Appendix G of [RFC8610]. All byte strings longer than a length of 20 SHOULD be displayed as base64 when possible.¶
bcast-rr = {
uas_type: nibble-field,
uas_ids: [+ uas-id-grp],
? auth: [+ auth-grp],
? self-grp,
? op_type: 0..3,
? area-grp,
? classification-grp,
? operator-grp
}
uas-id-grp = (
id_type: &uas-id-types,
uas_id: bstr .size(20)
)
uas-id-types = (none: 0, serial: 1, caa_id: 2, utm_id: 3, session_id: 4)
auth-grp = (
a_type: nibble-field,
a_data: bstr .size(1..362)
)
area-grp = (
area_count: 1..255,
area_radius: float,
area_floor: float,
area_ceiling: float
)
classification-grp = (
ua_class: 0..8,
eu_class: nibble-field,
eu_category: nibble-field
)
self-grp = (
desc_type: nibble-field,
description: tstr .size(23)
)
operator-grp = (
operator_id_type: nibble-field,
operator_id: bstr .size(20)
)
nibble-field = 0..15
The field names and their general typing are borrowed from the ASTM [F3411] data dictionary. See that document for additional information on fields semantics and units.¶
This document requests that the IANA delegate the 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa domain. IANA will be responsible for processing requests under the guidance of the Designated Expert.¶
This document requests a new registry for RAA Allocations under the DRIP registry group to be managed by IANA.¶
a 14-bit value used to represent RAAs. Future additions to this registry are to be made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]). The following values/ranges are defined:¶
| RAA Value(s) | Status | Allocation | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 - 3 | Reserved | N/A | N/A |
| 4 - 3999 | Allocated | ISO 3166-1 Countries | This RFC |
| 4000 - 16375 | Reserved | N/A | N/A |
| 16376 - 16383 | Allocated | DRIP WG (Experimental Use) | This RFC |
To support DNS delegation in ip6.arpa a single RAA is given 4 delegations by borrowing the upper two bits of HDA space. This enables a clean nibble boundary in DNS to delegate from (i.e. the prefix 2001:3x:xxx0::/44). These HDAs (0, 4096, 8192 and 12288) are reserved for the RAA.¶
The mapping between ISO 3166-1 Numeric Numbers and RAAs can be found as a CSV file on GitHub. Each Nation is assigned four RAAs that are left to the national authority for their purpose. For RAAs under this range a shorter prefix of 2001:3x:xx00::/40 MAY be delegated to each CAA, which covers all 4 RAAs (and reserved HDAs) assigned to them.¶
Requests in the DRIP WG allocation block MUST be forwarded to the contact point in the DRIP WG to evaluate the request and MUST contain a desired/proposed length of time for the allocation. Allocations in the block are not permanent and have a limited time the delegation is to be supported. The length of the time proposed is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the DRIP WG.¶
This document requests a new registry for HHIT Entity Type under the DRIP registry group.¶
numeric, 16-bit, field of the HHIT RRType to encode the HHIT Entity Type. Future additions to this registry are to be made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]). The following values are defined:¶
| Value | Type | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Not Defined | This RFC |
| 1 | DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME) | This RFC |
| 2 | DIME: Authentication CA | [drip-dki] |
| 3 | DIME: Issuing CA | [drip-dki] |
| 4 | Reserved | This RFC |
| 5 | Apex | This RFC |
| 6 | Apex: Authentication CA | [drip-dki] |
| 7 | Apex: Issuing CA | [drip-dki] |
| 8 | Reserved | This RFC |
| 9 | Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) | This RFC |
| 10 | RAA: Authentication CA | [drip-dki] |
| 11 | RAA: Issuing CA | [drip-dki] |
| 12 | Reserved | This RFC |
| 13 | HHIT Domain Authority (HDA) | This RFC |
| 14 | HDA: Authentication CA | [drip-dki] |
| 15 | HDA: Issuing CA | [drip-dki] |
| 16 | Uncrewed Aircraft (UA) | This RFC |
| 17 | Ground Control Station (GCS) | This RFC |
| 18 | Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS) | This RFC |
| 19 | Remote Identification (RID) Module | This RFC |
| 20 | Pilot | This RFC |
| 21 | Operator | This RFC |
| 22 | Discovery & Synchronization Service (DSS) | This RFC |
| 23 | UAS Service Supplier (USS) | This RFC |
| 24 | Network RID Service Provider (SP) | This RFC |
| 25 | Network RID Display Provider (DP) | This RFC |
| 26 | Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP) | This RFC |
| 27 - 65535 | Reserved | N/A |
Future additions to this registry MUST NOT be allowed if they can be covered under an existing registration.¶
The Registrar and Registry are commonly used concepts in the DNS. These components interface the DIME into the DNS hierarchy and thus operation SHOULD follow best common practices, specifically in security (such as running DNSSEC) as appropriate. The following RFC provide suitable guidance: [RFC7720], [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC5155], [RFC8945], [RFC2182], [RFC4786], [RFC3007].¶
If DNSSEC is used, a DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) SHOULD be developed and published. It SHOULD explain how DNSSEC has been deployed and what security measures are in place. [RFC6841] documents a Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements.¶
The interfaces and protocol specifications for registry-registrar interactions are intentionally not specified in this document. These will depend on nationally defined policy and prevailing local circumstances. It is expected registry-registrar activity will use the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) [RFC5730]. The registry SHOULD provide a lookup service such as WHOIS [RFC3912] or RDAP [RFC9082] to provide public information about registered domain names.¶
Decisions about DNS or registry best practices and other operational matters SHOULD be made by the CAA, ideally in consultation with local stakeholders. This document RECOMMENDS that DNSSEC SHOULD be used by both Apex (to control RAA levels) and RAA (to control HDA level) zones.¶
DETs are built upon asymmetric keys. As such the public key must be revealed to enable clients to perform signature verifications. [RFC9374] security considerations cover various attacks on such keys.¶
While unlikely the forging of a corresponding private key is possible if given enough time (and computational power). As such it is RECOMMENDED that the public key for any DET not be exposed in DNS (under any RRType) until it is required.¶
Optimally this requires the UAS somehow signal the DIME that a flight using a Specific Session ID will soon be underway or complete. It may also be facilitated under UTM if the USS (which may or may not be a DIME) signals when a given operation using a Session ID goes active.¶
Thanks to Stuart Card (AX Enterprize, LLC) and Bob Moskowitz (HTT Consulting, LLC) for their early work on the DRIP registries concept. Their early contributions laid the foundations for the content and processes of this architecture and document.¶