OPSAWG Q. Ma, Ed.
Internet-Draft Q. Wu
Intended status: Standards Track Huawei
Expires: 15 April 2025 M. Boucadair, Ed.
Orange
D. King
Lancaster University
12 October 2024
A YANG Data Model and RADIUS Extension for Policy-based Network Access
Control
draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-06
Abstract
This document defines a YANG data model for policy-based network
access control, which provides consistent and efficient enforcement
of network access control policies based on group identity.
Moreover, this document defines a mechanism to ease the maintenance
of the mapping between a user group identifier and a set of IP/MAC
addresses to enforce policy-based network access control.
In addition, the document defines a Remote Authentication Dial-in
User Service (RADIUS) attribute that is used to communicate the user
group identifier as part of identification and authorization
information.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Operations and
Management Area Working Group Working Group mailing list
(opsawg@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/opsawg/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/boucadair/policy-based-network-acl.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 April 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Sample Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Policy-based Network Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Endpoint Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.1. User Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.2. Device Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.3. Application Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Modules Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. The UCL Extension to the ACL Model . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. The "ietf-ucl-acl" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. User Access Control Group ID RADIUS Attribute . . . . . . . . 21
8. RADIUS Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.1. YANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10.2. RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. YANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Examples Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.1. Configuring the Controller Using Group based ACL . . . . 29
A.2. Configuring a PEP Using Group-based ACL . . . . . . . . . 31
A.3. Configuring PEPs Using Address-based ACLs . . . . . . . . 34
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1. Introduction
With the increased adoption of remote access technologies (e.g.,
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)) and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
policies, enterprises adopted more flexibility related to how, where,
and when employees work and collaborate. However, more flexibility
comes with increased risks. Enabling office flexibility (e.g.,
mobility across many access locations) introduces a set of challenges
for large-scale enterprises compared to conventional network access
management approaches. Examples of such challenges are listed below:
* Endpoints do not have stable IP addresses. For example, Wireless
LAN (WLAN) and VPN clients, as well as back-end Virtual Machine
(VM)-based servers, can move; their IP addresses could change as a
result. This means that relying on IP/transport fields (e.g., the
5-tuple) is inadequate to ensure consistent and efficient security
policy enforcement. IP address-based policies may not be flexible
enough to accommodate endpoints with volatile IP addresses.
* With the massive adoption of teleworking, there is a need to apply
different security policies to the same set of users under
different circumstances (e.g., prevent relaying attacks against a
local attachment point to the enterprise network). For example,
network access might be granted based upon criteria such as users'
access location, source network reputation, users' role, time-of-
day, type of network device used (e.g., corporate issued device
versus personal device), device's security posture, etc. This
means that the network needs to recognize the users' identity and
their current context, and map the users to their correct access
entitlement to the network.
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This document defines a YANG data model (Section 6.1) for policy-
based network access control, which extends the IETF Access Control
Lists (ACLs) module defined in [RFC8519]. This module can be used to
ensure consistent enforcement of ACL policies based on the group
identity.
The ACL concept has been generalized to be device-nonspecific, and
can be defined at network/administrative domain level
[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-extensions]. To allow for all applications of
ACLs, the YANG module for policy-based network ACL defined in
Section 6.1 does not limit how it can be used.
This document also defines a mechanism to establish a mapping between
(1) the user group identifier (ID) and (2) common IP packet header
fields and other encapsulating packet data (e.g., MAC address) to
execute the policy-based access control.
Additionally, the document defines a Remote Authentication Dial-in
User Service (RADIUS) [RFC2865] attribute that is used to communicate
the user group identifier as part of identification and authorization
information (Section 7).
Although the document cites MAC addresses as an example in some
sections, the document does not make assumptions about which
identifiers are used to trigger ACLs. These examples should not be
considered as recommendations. Readers should be aware that MAC-
based ACLs can be bypassed by flushing out the MAC address. Other
implications related to the change of MAC addresses are discussed in
[I-D.ietf-madinas-use-cases].
The document does not specify how to map the policy group identifiers
to dedicated fields (e.g., Group Based Policy (GBP) discussed in
Section 6.2.3 of [RFC9638]).
The YANG data model in this document conforms to the Network
Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) defined in [RFC8342].
1.1. Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
Note to the RFC Editor: This section is to be removed prior to
publication.
This document contains placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note
summarizes all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC
Editor instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Please apply the following replacements:
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* XXXX --> the assigned RFC number for this document
* SSSS --> the assigned RFC number for
[I-D.ietf-netmod-schedule-yang]
* 2023-01-19 --> the actual date of the publication of this document
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The meanings of the symbols in tree diagrams are defined in
[RFC8340].
The document uses the following definition in [RFC3198]:
* policy
The document uses the following definitions and acronyms defined in
[RFC8519]:
* Access Control Entry (ACE)
* Access Control List (ACL)
The following definitions and acronyms are used throughout this
document:
* User group based Control List (UCL) model: A YANG data model for
policy-based network access control that specifies an extension
to the "ietf-access-control-list" model [RFC8519]. It allows
policy enforcement based on the group identity, which can be
used both at the network device level and at the network/
administrative domain level.
* Endpoint: refers to an end-user, host device, or application that
actually connects to a network. An end-user is defined as a
person. A host device provides compute, memory, storage and
networking capabilities and connects to the network without any
user intervention. Host devices refer to servers, IoTs and
other devices owned by the enterprise. An application is a
software program used for a specific service.
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3. Sample Usage
Access to some networks (e.g., enterprise networks) requires to
recognize the users’ identities no matter how, where, and when they
connect to the network resources. Then, the network maps the
(connecting) users to their access authorization rights. Such rights
are defined following local policies. As discussed in Section 1,
because (1) there is a large number of users and (2) a user may have
different source IP addresses in different network segments,
deploying a network access control policy for each IP address or
network segment is a heavy workload. An alternate approach is to
configure endpoint groups to classify users and enterprise devices
and associate ACLs with endpoint groups so that endpoints in each
group can share a group of ACL rules. This approach greatly reduces
the workload of the administrators and optimizes the ACL resources.
The network ACLs can be provisioned on devices using specific
mechanisms, such as [RFC8519] or [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-extensions].
Different policies may need to be applied in different contextual
situations. For example, companies may restrict (or grant) employees
access to specific internal or external resources during work hours,
while another policy is adopted during off-hours and weekends. A
network administrator may also require to enforce traffic shaping
(Section 2.3.3.3 of [RFC2475]) and policing ( Section 2.3.3.4 of
[RFC2475]) during peak hours in order not to affect other data
services.
4. Policy-based Network Access Control
4.1. Overview
The architecture of a system that provides real-time and consistent
enforcement of access control policies is shown in Figure 1. This
architecture includes the following functional entities and
interfaces:
* A service orchestrator which coordinates the overall service,
including security policies. The service may be connectivity or
any other access to resources that can be hosted and offered by a
network.
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* A software-defined networking (SDN) [RFC7149] [RFC7426] controller
which is responsible for maintaining endpoint-group based ACLs and
mapping the endpoint-group to the associated attributes
information (e.g., IP/MAC address). An SDN controller also
behaves as a Policy Decision Point (PDP) [RFC3198] and pushes the
required access control policies to relevant Policy Enforcement
Points (PEPs) [RFC3198]. A PDP is also known as "policy server"
[RFC2753].
An SDN controller may interact with an Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) [RFC3539] server or a Network
Access Server (NAS) [RFC7542].
* A Network Access Server (NAS) entity which handles authentication
requests. The NAS interacts with an AAA server to complete user
authentication using protocols like RADIUS [RFC2865]. When access
is granted, the AAA server provides the group identifier (group
ID) to which the user belongs when the user first logs onto the
network. A new RADIUS attribute is defined in Section 7 for this
purpose.
* The AAA server provides a collection of authentication,
authorization, and accounting functions. The AAA server is
responsible for centralized user information management. The AAA
server is preconfigured with user credentials (e.g., user name and
password), possible group identities and related user attributes
(users may be divided into different groups based on different
user attributes).
* The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is the central entity which is
responsible for enforcing appropriate access control policies. A
first deployment scenario assumes that the SDN controller maps the
group ID to the related common packet header and delivers IP/MAC
address based ACL policies to the required PEPs. Another
deployment scenario may require that PEPs map incoming packets to
their associated source and/or destination endpoint-group IDs, and
acts upon the endpoint-group ID based ACL policies (e.g., a group
identifier may be carried in packet headers such as discussed in
Section 6.2.3 of [RFC9638]). More details are provided in
Section 9.
Multiple PEPs may be involved in a network.
A PEP exposes a NETCONF interface [RFC6241] to an SDN controller.
Figure 1 provides the overall architecture and procedure for policy-
based access control management.
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.------------.
|Orchestrator|
'------+-----'
Service | (Step 1)
--------------------------------------------------------
|
Network |
(Step 4) |
.-------. .--------. .--------+-----------.
|User #1+--+ | AAA | | SDN Controller |
'-------' | | Server +-----+ (PDP) |
| '----+---' '--------+-----------'
| | |
| | +------+--------+(Step 5)
(Step 2) | |(Step 3) | |
| | | |
| .-+-----------+---------------+------------.
| | .----------------------. .--------------.|
.-------. +--------+ | Network Access Server| |firewall, etc.||
|User #2+-----------+ | (NAS) | '--------------'|
'-------' | '----------------------' |
| (PEP) |
'------------------------------------------'
Figure 1: An Architecture for Group-based Policy Management
In reference to Figure 1, the following typical flow is experienced:
Step 1: Administrators (or a service orchestrator) configure an SDN
controller with network-level ACLs using the YANG module defined
in Section 6.1. An example is provided in Appendix A.1.
Step 2: When a user first logs onto the network, he/she is required
to be authenticated (e.g., using user name and password) at the
NAS.
Step 3: The authentication request is then relayed to the AAA server
using a protocol such as RADIUS [RFC2865]. It is assumed that the
AAA server has been appropriately configured to store user
credentials, e.g., user name, password, group information, and
other user attributes. This document does not restrict what
authentication method is used. Administrators may refer to, e.g.,
Section 7.4 of [I-D.ietf-radext-deprecating-radius] for
authentication method recommendations. If the authentication
request succeeds, the user is placed in a user group the identity
of which is returned to the network access server as the
authentication result (see Section 7). If the authentication
fails, the user is not assigned any user group, which also means
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that the user has no access; or the user is assigned a special
group with very limited access permissions for the network (as a
function of the local policy). ACLs are enforced so that flows
from that IP address are discarded (or rate-limited) by the
network. In some implementations, AAA server can be integrated
with an SDN controller.
Step 4: Either the AAA server or the NAS notifies an SDN controller
of the mapping between the user group ID and related common packet
header attributes (e.g., IP/MAC address).
Step 5: Either group or IP/MAC address based access control policies
are maintained on relevant PEPs under the SDN controller's
management. Whether the PEP enforces the group or IP/MAC address
based ACL is implementation specific. Both types of ACL policy
may exist on the PEP. Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3 elaborate on
each case.
4.2. Endpoint Group
4.2.1. User Group
The user group is determined by a set of predefined policy criteria
(e.g., source IP address, geolocation data, time of day, or device
certificate). It uses an identifier (user group ID) to represent the
collective identity of a group of users. Users may be moved to
different user-groups if their composite attributes, environment,
and/or local enterprise policy change.
A user is authenticated, and classified at the AAA server, and
assigned to a user group. A user's group membership may change as
aspects of the user change. For example, if the user group
membership is determined solely by the source IP address, then a
given user's group ID will change when the user moves to a new IP
address that falls outside of the range of addresses of the previous
user group.
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This document does not make any assumption about how user groups are
defined. Such considerations are deployment specific and are out of
scope. However, and for illustration purposes, Table 1 shows an
example of how user group definitions may be characterized. User
groups may share several common criteria. That is, user group
criteria are not mutually exclusive. For example, the policy
criteria of user groups R&D Regular and R&D BYOD may share the same
set of users that belong to the R&D organization, and differ only in
the type of clients (firm-issued clients vs. users' personal
clients). Likewise, the same user may be assigned to different user
groups depending on the time of day or the type of day (e.g.,
weekdays versus weekends), etc.
+============+==========+===================================+
| Group Name | Group ID | Group Description |
+============+==========+===================================+
| R&D | foo-10 | R&D employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
| R&D BYOD | foo-11 | Personal devices of R&D employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
| Sales | foo-20 | Sales employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
| VIP | foo-30 | VIP employees |
+------------+----------+-----------------------------------+
Table 1: User Group Example
4.2.2. Device Group
The device-group ID is an identifier that represents the collective
identity of a group of enterprise end devices. An enterprise device
could be a server that hosts applications or software that deliver
services to enterprise users. It could also be an enterprise IoT
device that serve a limited purpose, e.g., a printer that allows
users to scan, print and send emails. Table 2 shows an example of
how device-group definitions may be characterized.
+==================+==========+===========================+
| Group Name | Group ID | Group Description |
+==================+==========+===========================+
| Workflow | bar-40 | Workflow resource servers |
+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| R&D Resource | bar-50 | R&D resource servers |
+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
| Printer Resource | bar-60 | Printer resources |
+------------------+----------+---------------------------+
Table 2: Device-Group Example
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Users accessing an enterprise device should be strictly controlled.
Matching abstract device group ID instead of specified addresses in
ACL polices helps shield the consequences of address change (e.g.,
back-end VM-based server migration).
4.2.3. Application Group
An application group is a collection of applications that share a
common access control policies. A device may run multiple
applications, and different policies might need to be applied to the
applications and device. A single application may need to run on
multiple devices/VMs/containers, the abstraction of application group
eases the process of application migration. For example, the policy
does not depend on the transport coordinates (i.e., 5-tuple).
Table 3 shows an example of how application-group definitions may be
characterized.
+=======================+==========+==========================+
| Group Name | Group ID | Group Description |
+=======================+==========+==========================+
| Audio/Video Streaming | baz-70 | Audio/Video conferencing |
| | | application |
+-----------------------+----------+--------------------------+
| Instant messaging | baz-80 | Messaging application |
+-----------------------+----------+--------------------------+
| document | baz-90 | Real-time document |
| collaboration | | editing application |
+-----------------------+----------+--------------------------+
Table 3: Application-Group Example
5. Modules Overview
5.1. The UCL Extension to the ACL Model
This module specifies an extension to the "ietf-access-control-list"
module [RFC8519]. This extension adds endpoint groups so that an
endpoint group identifier can be matched upon, and also enable access
control policy activation based on date and time conditions.
Figure 2 provides the tree structure of the "ietf-ucl-acl" module.
module: ietf-ucl-acl
augment /acl:acls:
+--rw endpoint-groups {uacl:group}?
+--rw endpoint-group* [group-id]
+--rw group-id string
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+--rw group-type? identityref
augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches:
+--rw endpoint-group {uacl:match-on-group}?
+--rw source-group-id? group-id-reference
+--rw destination-group-id? group-id-reference
augment /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace:
+--rw effective-schedule {uacl:schedule}?
+--rw (schedule-type)?
+--:(period)
| +--rw period-description? string
| +--rw period-start yang:date-and-time
| +--rw time-zone-identifier? sys:timezone-name
| +--rw (period-type)?
| +--:(explicit)
| | +--rw period-end? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(duration)
| +--rw duration? duration
+--:(recurrence) {schedule:icalendar-recurrence}?
+--rw recurrence-first
| +--rw start-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--rw duration? duration
| +--rw time-zone-identifier? sys:timezone-name
+--rw (recurrence-end)?
| +--:(until)
| | +--rw until? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(count)
| +--rw count? uint32
+--rw recurrence-description? string
+--rw frequency identityref
+--rw interval? uint32
+--rw period* [period-start]
| +--rw period-description? string
| +--rw period-start yang:date-and-time
| +--rw time-zone-identifier? sys:timezone-name
| +--rw (period-type)?
| +--:(explicit)
| | +--rw period-end? yang:date-and-time
| +--:(duration)
| +--rw duration? duration
+--rw bysecond* uint32
+--rw byminute* uint32
+--rw byhour* uint32
+--rw byday* [weekday]
| +--rw direction* int32
| +--rw weekday schedule:weekday
+--rw bymonthday* int32
+--rw byyearday* int32
+--rw byyearweek* int32
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+--rw byyearmonth* uint32
+--rw bysetpos* int32
+--rw workweek-start? schedule:weekday
+--rw exception-dates* yang:date-and-time
Figure 2: UCL Extension
The first part of the data model augments the "acl" list in the
"ietf-access-control-list" model [RFC8519] with an "endpoint-groups"
container having a list of "endpoint group" inside, each entry has a
"group-id" that uniquely identifies the endpoint group and a "group-
type" parameter to specify the endpoint group type.
"group-id" is defined as a string rather than unsigned integer
(e.g., uint32) to accommodate deployments which require some
identification hierarchy within a domain. Such a hierarchy is
meant to ease coordination within an administrative domain. There
might be cases where a domain needs to tag packets with the group
they belong to. The tagging does not need to mirror exactly the
"group id" used to populate the policy. How the "group-id" string
is mapped to the tagging or field in the packet header in
encapsulation scenario is outside the scope of this document.
Augmentation may be considered in the future to cover
encapsulation considerations.
The second part of the data model augments the "matches" container in
the IETF ACL model [RFC8519] so that a source and/or destination
endpoint group index can be referenced as the match criteria.
The third part of the data model augments the "ace" list in the
"ietf-access-control-list" model [RFC8519] with date and time
specific parameters to allow ACE to be activated based on a date/time
condition. Two types of time range are defined, which reuse
"recurrence" and "period" groupings defined in the "ietf-schedule"
YANG module in [I-D.ietf-netmod-schedule-yang], respectively. Note
that the data model augments the definition of "recurrence" grouping
with a "duration" data node to specify the duration of time for each
occurrence the policy activation is triggered.
6. YANG Modules
6.1. The "ietf-ucl-acl" YANG Module
This module imports types and groupings defined in the "ietf-
schedule" module [I-D.ietf-netmod-schedule-yang]. It also augments
the "ietf-access-control-list" module [RFC8519].
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<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ucl-acl@2023-01-19.yang"
module ietf-ucl-acl {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl";
prefix uacl;
import ietf-access-control-list {
prefix acl;
reference
"RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
Control Lists (ACLs)";
}
import ietf-schedule {
prefix schedule;
reference
"RFC SSSS: A Common YANG Data Model for Scheduling";
}
organization
"IETF OPSWG Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/opsawg/>
WG List: <mailto:opsawg@ietf.org>
Editor: Qiufang Ma
<mailto:maqiufang1@huawei.com
Author: Qin Wu
<mailto:bill.wu@huawei.com>
Editor: Mohamed Boucadair
<mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Author: Daniel King
<mailto:d.king@lancaster.ac.uk>";
description
"This YANG module augments the IETF access control lists (ACLs)
module and is meant to ensure consistent enforcement of ACL
policies based on the group identity.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
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(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2023-01-19 {
description
"Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model and RADIUS Extension for
Policy-based Network Access Control";
}
feature schedule {
description
"Indicates support of schedule-based ACEs.";
}
feature match-on-group {
description
"Indicates support of matching on endpoint groups.";
}
feature group {
if-feature "uacl:match-on-group";
description
"Indicates support of group-based ACLs.";
}
feature mixed-ipv4-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-ipv4 and uacl:match-on-group";
description
"IPv4 and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-ipv6 and uacl:match-on-group";
description
"IPv6 and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-ipv4-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-ipv4 and acl:match-on-ipv6 and "
+ "uacl:match-on-group";
description
"IPv4, IPv6, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and uacl:match-on-group";
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description
"Eth and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-ipv4-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and acl:match-on-ipv4 and "
+ "uacl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth, IPv4, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and acl:match-on-ipv6 and "
+ "uacl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth, IPv6, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
feature mixed-eth-ipv4-ipv6-group {
if-feature "acl:match-on-eth and acl:match-on-ipv4 and "
+ "acl:match-on-ipv6 and uacl:match-on-group";
description
"Eth, IPv4, IPv6, and group ACL combinations supported.";
}
identity group-acl-type {
if-feature "group";
base acl:acl-base;
description
"An Access Control List (ACL) that matches based on an endpoint
group identity, which can represent the collective identity of
a group of authenticated users, end devices, or applications.
An endpoint group identity may be carried in the outer/inner
packet header (e.g., via NVO3 encapsulation), may also not
correspond to any field in the packet header. Matching on
Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the Access Control
Entries (ACEs).";
}
identity mixed-ipv4-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-ipv4-group";
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the IPv4 header and endpoint group identities, which can
represent the collective identity of a group of authenticated
users, end devices, or applications. Matching on Layer 4
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header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-ipv6-group";
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the IPv6 header and endpoint group identities, which can
represent the collective identity of a group of authenticated
users, end devices, or applications. Matching on Layer 4
header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-ipv4-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-ipv4-ipv6-group";
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the IPv4 header, IPv6 header, and endpoint group identities,
which can represent the collective identity of a group of
authenticated users, end devices, or applications. Matching
on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header and endpoint group identities,
which can represent the collective identity of a group of
authenticated users, end devices, or applications. Matching
on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-ipv4-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-ipv4-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header, IPv4 header, and endpoint group
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identities, which can represent the collective identity of a
group of authenticated users, end devices or applications.
Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the
ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-ipv6-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header, IPv6 header, and endpoint group
identities, which can represent the collective identity of
a group of authenticated users, end devices or applications.
Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist in the
ACEs.";
}
identity mixed-eth-ipv4-ipv6-group-type {
if-feature "mixed-eth-ipv4-ipv6-group";
base acl:eth-acl-type;
base acl:ipv4-acl-type;
base acl:ipv6-acl-type;
base uacl:group-acl-type;
description
"An ACL that contains a mix of entries that match on fields
in the Ethernet header, IPv4 header, IPv6 header, and endpoint
group identities, which can represent the collective identity
of a group of authenticated users, end devices or
applications. Matching on Layer 4 header fields may also exist
in the ACEs.";
}
identity endpoint-group-type {
description
"Identity for the type of endpoint group.";
}
identity user-group {
base uacl:endpoint-group-type;
description
"Identity for the user endpoint group.";
}
identity device-group {
base uacl:endpoint-group-type;
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description
"Identity for the device endpoint group.";
}
identity application-group {
base uacl:endpoint-group-type;
description
"Identity for the application endpoint group.";
}
typedef group-id-reference {
type leafref {
path "/acl:acls/uacl:endpoint-groups"
+ "/uacl:endpoint-group/uacl:group-id";
}
description
"Defines a reference to a group identifier.";
}
augment "/acl:acls" {
if-feature "uacl:group";
description
"Adds a container for endpoint group definition.";
container endpoint-groups {
description
"Defines a container for the endpoint group list.";
list endpoint-group {
key "group-id";
description
"Definition of the endpoint group list.";
leaf group-id {
type string {
length "1..64";
}
description
"The endpoint group identifier that uniquely identifies
an endpoint group.";
}
leaf group-type {
type identityref {
base endpoint-group-type;
}
description
"Specifies the endpoint group type.";
}
}
}
}
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augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches" {
if-feature "uacl:match-on-group";
description
"Specifies how a source and/or destination endpoint group
index can be referenced as the match criteria in the ACEs.";
container endpoint-group {
when "derived-from-or-self(/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:type, "
+ "'uacl:group-acl-type')";
description
"Adds new match types.";
leaf source-group-id {
type group-id-reference;
description
"The matched source endpoint group ID.";
}
leaf destination-group-id {
type group-id-reference;
description
"The matched destination endpoint group ID.";
}
}
}
augment "/acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace" {
if-feature "uacl:schedule";
description
"Adds schedule parameters to allow the ACE to take effect
based on date and time.";
container effective-schedule {
description
"Defines when the access control entry rules
are in effect based on date and time condition.
If it is not configured, the access control entry
is immediately and always in effect.";
choice schedule-type {
description
"Choice based on the type of the time range.";
case period {
description
"The ACE takes effect based on a precise period of
time.";
uses schedule:period-of-time;
}
case recurrence {
if-feature "schedule:icalendar-recurrence";
description
"The ACE takes effect based on a recurrence rule.";
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uses schedule:icalendar-recurrence;
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
7. User Access Control Group ID RADIUS Attribute
The User-Access-Group-ID RADIUS attribute is defined with a globally
unique name. The definition of the attribute follows the guidelines
in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC6929]. This attribute is used to indicate
the user group ID to be used by the NAS. When the User-Access-Group-
ID RADIUS attribute is present in the RADIUS Access-Accept, the
system applies the related access control to the users after it
authenticates.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute is of type "string" as defined in
Section 3.5 of [RFC8044].
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MAY appear in a RADIUS Access-
Accept packet. It MAY also appear in a RADIUS Access-Request packet
as a hint to the RADIUS server to indicate a preference. However,
the server is not required to honor such a preference. If more than
one instance of the User-Access-Group-ID Attribute appears in a
RADIUS Access-Accept packet, this means that the user is a member of
many groups.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MAY appear in a RADIUS CoA-Request
packet.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MAY appear in a RADIUS Accounting-
Request packet. Specifically, this may be used by a NAS to
acknowledge that the attribute was received in the RADIUS Access-
Request and the NAS is enforcing that policy.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute MUST NOT appear in any other
RADIUS packet.
The User-Access-Group-ID Attribute is structured as follows:
Type
TBA1
Length
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This field indicates the total length, in octets, of all fields of
this attribute, including the Type, Length, Extended-Type, and the
"Value".
The Length MUST be at most 67 octets.
Data Type
string (Section 3.5 of [RFC8044])
Value
This field contains the user group ID.
8. RADIUS Attributes
Table 4 provides a guide as what type of RADIUS packets that may
contain User-Access-Group-ID Attribute, and in what quantity.
+================+=========+=========+===========+==============+
| Access-Request | Access- | Access- | Challenge | Attribute |
| | Accept | Reject | | |
+================+=========+=========+===========+==============+
| 0+ | 0+ | 0 | 0 | User-Access- |
| | | | | Group-ID |
+----------------+---------+---------+-----------+--------------+
| Accounting- | CoA- | CoA-ACK | CoA-NACK | Attribute |
| Request | Request | | | |
+----------------+---------+---------+-----------+--------------+
| 0+ | 0+ | 0 | 0 | User-Access- |
| | | | | Group-ID |
+----------------+---------+---------+-----------+--------------+
Table 4: Table of Attributes
Notation for Table 4:
0 This attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
0+ Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be present in
packet.
9. Implementation Considerations
The UCL model can be implemented in different ways.
In some cases, the UCL model is implemented at the network/
administrative domain level with an SDN controller maintaining the
dynamical mapping from endpoint group ID to IP/transport fields
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(e.g., the 5-tuple) and programing the PEPs with IP address/5-tuple
based ACLs. In such cases, PEPs do not require to implement specific
logic (including hardware) compared to the enforcement of
conventional ACLs.
It is possible for the UCL model to be implemented at the network
device level. While it eliminates the need for an SDN controller to
interact frequently with the PEPs for reasons like the user's context
of network connection change or VM/application migration, dedicated
hardware/software support might be needed for PEPs to understand the
endpoint group identifier. In scenarios where the NAS behaves as the
PEP which acquires the source and/or destination endpoint group ID
from the AAA server, ACL policy enforcement based on the group
identity without being encapsulated into packet headers might affect
the forwarding performance. Implementations need to evaluate the
operational tradeoff (flexibility brought to the network vs. the
complexity of implementation) carefully. Such assessment is out of
scope of this document.
10. Security Considerations
10.1. YANG
This section is modeled after the template described in Section 3.7
of [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis].
The "ietf-ucl-acl" YANG module defines a data model that is designed
to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols such as NETCONF
[RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. These protocols have to use a
secure transport layer (e.g., SSH [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446], and QUIC
[RFC9000]) and have to use mutual authentication.
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., "config true", which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config)
and delete operations to these data nodes without proper protection
or authentication can have a negative effect on network operations.
Specifically, the following subtrees and data nodes have particular
sensitivities/vulnerabilities:
* /acl:acls/uacl:endpoint-groups/uacl:endpoint-group: This list
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specifies all the endpoint group entries. Unauthorized write
access to this list can allow intruders to modify the entries
so as to forge an endpoint group that does not exist or
maliciously delete an existing endpoint group, which could be
used to craft an attack.
* /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/acl:matches/uacl:endpoint-
group: This subtree specifies a source and/or endpoint group
index as match criteria in the ACEs. Unauthorized write access
to this data node may allow intruders to modify the group
identity so as to permit access that should not be permitted,
or deny access that should be permitted.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.
It is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-
config, or notification) to these data nodes. Specifically, the
following subtrees and data nodes have particular sensitivities/
vulnerabilities:
* /acl:acls/acl:acl/acl:aces/acl:ace/uacl:effective-schedule: This
subtree specifies when the access control entry rules are in
effect. An unauthorized read access of the list will allow the
attacker to determine which rules are in effect, to better
craft an attack.
10.2. RADIUS
RADIUS-related security considerations are discussed in [RFC2865].
This document targets deployments where a trusted relationship is in
place between the RADIUS client and server with communication
optionally secured by IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[RFC6614].
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. YANG
This document registers the following URIs in the "IETF XML Registry"
[RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers the following YANG modules in the "YANG
Module Names" registry [RFC6020].
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name: ietf-ucl-acl
prefix: uacl
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl
maintained by IANA? N
reference: RFC XXXX
11.2. RADIUS
This document requests IANA to assign a new RADIUS attribute type
from the IANA registry "Radius Attribute Types" [RADIUS-Types]:
+=======+======================+===========+===============+
| Value | Description | Data Type | Reference |
+=======+======================+===========+===============+
| TBA1 | User-Access-Group-ID | string | This-Document |
+-------+----------------------+-----------+---------------+
Table 5: RADIUS Attribute
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netmod-schedule-yang]
Ma, Q., Wu, Q., Boucadair, M., and D. King, "A Common YANG
Data Model for Scheduling", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-netmod-schedule-yang-03, 10 October
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
netmod-schedule-yang-03>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2865>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3688>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
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[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC6929] DeKok, A. and A. Lior, "Remote Authentication Dial In User
Service (RADIUS) Protocol Extensions", RFC 6929,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6929, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6929>.
[RFC8044] DeKok, A., "Data Types in RADIUS", RFC 8044,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8044, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8044>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8341>.
[RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
(NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8342>.
[RFC8519] Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Huang, L., and D. Blair,
"YANG Data Model for Network Access Control Lists (ACLs)",
RFC 8519, DOI 10.17487/RFC8519, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8519>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-madinas-use-cases]
Henry, J. and Y. Lee, "Randomized and Changing MAC Address
Use Cases", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
madinas-use-cases-10, 23 June 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas-
use-cases-10>.
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[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-extensions]
de Dios, O. G., Barguil, S., Boucadair, M., and Q. Wu,
"Extensions to the Access Control Lists (ACLs) YANG
Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netmod-acl-extensions-10, 29 May 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
acl-extensions-10>.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis]
Bierman, A., Boucadair, M., and Q. Wu, "Guidelines for
Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data
Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netmod-rfc8407bis-18, 11 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
rfc8407bis-18>.
[I-D.ietf-radext-deprecating-radius]
DeKok, A., "Deprecating Insecure Practices in RADIUS",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-radext-
deprecating-radius-03, 7 August 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-radext-
deprecating-radius-03>.
[I-D.smith-vxlan-group-policy]
Smith, M. and L. Kreeger, "VXLAN Group Policy Option",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-smith-vxlan-group-
policy-05, 22 October 2018,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-smith-vxlan-
group-policy-05>.
[I-D.yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-groups]
Li, Y., Shen, L., and Y. Zhou, "Autonomic IP Address To
Access Control Group ID Mapping", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-
groups-02, 15 November 2021,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yizhou-anima-
ip-to-access-control-groups-02>.
[I-D.you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy]
You, J., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Boucadair, M., Li, Y.,
Strassner, J., and S. Majee, "User-group-based Security
Policy for Service Layer", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy-02, 8 July
2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-you-
i2nsf-user-group-based-policy-02>.
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[RADIUS-Types]
IANA, "RADIUS Types",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types>.
[RFC2475] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
Services", RFC 2475, DOI 10.17487/RFC2475, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2475>.
[RFC2753] Yavatkar, R., Pendarakis, D., and R. Guerin, "A Framework
for Policy-based Admission Control", RFC 2753,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2753, January 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2753>.
[RFC3198] Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling,
M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry,
J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based
Management", RFC 3198, DOI 10.17487/RFC3198, November
2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3198>.
[RFC3539] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", RFC 3539,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3539, June 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3539>.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4252>.
[RFC6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC6614, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6614>.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
Environment", RFC 7149, DOI 10.17487/RFC7149, March 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7149>.
[RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Ed., Pentikousis, K., Ed., Denazis, S.,
Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., and O. Koufopavlou, "Software-
Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture
Terminology", RFC 7426, DOI 10.17487/RFC7426, January
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7426>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.
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[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8340>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
[RFC9638] Boutros, S. and D. Eastlake 3rd, Ed., "Network
Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3) Encapsulation
Considerations", RFC 9638, DOI 10.17487/RFC9638, September
2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9638>.
Appendix A. Examples Usage
A.1. Configuring the Controller Using Group based ACL
Let's consider an organization that would like to manage the access
of R&D employees that bring personally owned devices (BYOD) into the
workplace.
The access requirements are as follows:
* Permit traffic from R&D BYOD of employees, destined to R&D
employees' devices every work day from 8:00:00 to 18:00:00 UTC,
starting in January 1st, 2025.
* Deny traffic from R&D BYOD of employees, destined to finance
servers located in the enterprise DC network starting at 8:30:00
of January 20, 2025 with an offset of -08:00 from UTC (Pacific
Standard Time) and ending at 18:00:00 in Pacific Standard Time on
December 31, 2025.
The example shown in Figure 3 illustrates the configuration of an SDN
controller using the group-based ACL:
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<acls xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-access-control-list"
xmlns:uacl="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<endpoint-groups
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<endpoint-group>
<group-id>R&D</group-id>
<group-type>user-group</group-type>
</endpoint-group>
<endpoint-group>
<group-id>R&D BYOD</group-id>
<group-type>user-group</group-type>
</endpoint-group>
<endpoint-group>
<group-id>finance server</group-id>
<group-type>device-group</group-type>
</endpoint-group>
</endpoint-groups>
<acl>
<name>sample-group-acl</name>
<type>uacl:group-acl-type</type>
<aces>
<ace>
<name>rule1</name>
<matches>
<endpoint-group
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<source-group-id>R&D BYOD</source-group-id>
<destination-group-id>R&D</destination-group-id>
</endpoint-group>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>accept</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl"
xmlns:schedule="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-schedule">
<recurrence-first>
<start-time>2025-01-01T08:00:00Z</start-time>
<duration>PT10:00:00</duration>
</recurrence-first>
<frequency>schedule:daily</frequency>
<byday>
<weekday>monday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
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<weekday>tuesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>wednesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>thursday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>friday</weekday>
</byday>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
<ace>
<name>rule2</name>
<matches>
<endpoint-group
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<source-group-id>R&D BYOD</source-group-id>
<destination-group-id>finance server</destination-group-\
id>
</endpoint-group>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>reject</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl">
<period-start>2025-01-20T08:30:00-08:00</period-start>
<period-end>2025-12-31T18:00:00-08:00</period-end>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
</aces>
</acl>
</acls>
Figure 3: Example of UCL Configuration
A.2. Configuring a PEP Using Group-based ACL
This section illustrates an example to configure a PEP using the
group-based ACL.
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The PEP which enforces group-based ACL may acquire group identities
from the AAA server if working as a NAS authenticating both the
source endpoint and the destination endpoint users. Another case for
a PEP enforcing a group-based ACL is to obtain the group identity of
the source endpoint directly from the packet field
[I-D.smith-vxlan-group-policy]. This example does not intend to be
exhaustive.
Assume the mapping between device group ID and IP addresses is
predefined or acquired via device authentication. Figure 4 shows the
ACL configuration delivered from the controller to the PEP. This
example is consistent with the example presented in Appendix A.1.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<acls xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-access-control-list"
xmlns:uacl="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<endpoint-groups
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<endpoint-group>
<group-id>R&D</group-id>
<group-type>user-group</group-type>
</endpoint-group>
<endpoint-group>
<group-id>R&D BYOD</group-id>
<group-type>user-group</group-type>
</endpoint-group>
</endpoint-groups>
<acl>
<name>sample-group-acl</name>
<type>uacl:mixed-ipv4-group-type</type>
<aces>
<ace>
<name>rule1</name>
<matches>
<endpoint-group
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<source-group-id>R&D BYOD</source-group-id>
<destination-group-id>R&D</destination-group-id>
</endpoint-group>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>accept</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl"
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xmlns:schedule="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-schedule">
<recurrence-first>
<start-time>2025-01-01T08:00:00Z</start-time>
<duration>PT10:00:00</duration>
</recurrence-first>
<frequency>schedule:daily</frequency>
<byday>
<weekday>monday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>tuesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>wednesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>thursday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>friday</weekday>
</byday>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
<ace>
<name>rule2</name>
<matches>
<endpoint-group
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ucl-acl">
<source-group-id>R&D BYOD</source-group-id>
</endpoint-group>
<ipv4>
<destination-ipv4-network>203.0.113.1/24</destination-\
ipv4-network>
</ipv4>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>reject</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl">
<period-start>2025-01-20T08:30:00-08:00</period-start>
<period-end>2025-12-31T18:00:00-08:00</period-end>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
</aces>
</acl>
</acls>
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Figure 4: Example of PEP Configuration
A.3. Configuring PEPs Using Address-based ACLs
The section describes an example of configuring a PEP using IP
address based ACL. IP address based access control policies could be
applied to the PEP that may not understand the group information,
e.g., firewall.
Assume an employee in the R&D department accesses the network
wirelessly from a non-corporate laptop using IP address 192.0.2.10.
The SDN controller associates the user group to which the employee
belongs with the user address according to step 1 to 4 in
Section 4.1.
Assume the mapping between device group ID and IP addresses is
predefined or acquired via device authentication. Figure 5 shows an
IPv4 address based ACL configuration delivered from the controller to
the PEP. This example is consistent with the example presented in
Appendix A.1.
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<acls xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-access-control-list">
<acl>
<name>sample-group-acl</name>
<type>ipv4-acl-type</type>
<aces>
<ace>
<name>rule1</name>
<matches>
<ipv4>
<destination-ipv4-network>192.168.2.1/24</destination-\
ipv4-network>
<source-ipv4-network>192.168.1.1/24</source-ipv4-network>
</ipv4>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>accept</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl"
xmlns:schedule="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-schedule">
<recurrence-first>
<start-time>2025-01-01T08:00:00Z</start-time>
<duration>PT10:00:00</duration>
</recurrence-first>
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<frequency>schedule:daily</frequency>
<byday>
<weekday>monday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>tuesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>wednesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>thursday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>friday</weekday>
</byday>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
<ace>
<name>rule2</name>
<matches>
<ipv4>
<destination-ipv4-network>203.0.113.1/24</destination-\
ipv4-network>
<source-ipv4-network>192.168.1.1/24</source-ipv4-network>
</ipv4>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>reject</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl">
<period-start>2025-01-20T08:30:00-08:00</period-start>
<period-end>2025-12-31T18:00:00-08:00</period-end>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
</aces>
</acl>
</acls>
Figure 5: Example of PEP Configuration
Figure 6 shows an example of the same policy but with a destination
IPv6 prefix.
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=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<acls xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-access-control-list">
<acl>
<name>another-sample-but-with-ipv6</name>
<type>ipv6-acl-type</type>
<aces>
<ace>
<name>rule1</name>
<matches>
<ipv6>
<destination-ipv6-network>2001:db8::/64</destination-\
ipv6-network>
</ipv6>
</matches>
<actions>
<forwarding>accept</forwarding>
</actions>
<effective-schedule xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-\
ucl-acl"
xmlns:schedule="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-schedule">
<recurrence-first>
<start-time>2025-01-01T08:00:00Z</start-time>
<duration>PT10:00:00</duration>
</recurrence-first>
<frequency>schedule:daily</frequency>
<byday>
<weekday>monday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>tuesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>wednesday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>thursday</weekday>
</byday>
<byday>
<weekday>friday</weekday>
</byday>
</effective-schedule>
</ace>
</aces>
</acl>
</acls>
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Figure 6: Example of PEP Configuration (IPv6)
Acknowledgments
This work has benefited from the discussions of User-group-based
Security Policy over the years. In particular,
[I-D.you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy] and
[I-D.yizhou-anima-ip-to-access-control-groups] provide mechanisms to
establish a mapping between the IP address/prefix of users and access
control group IDs.
Jianjie You, Myo Zarny, Christian Jacquenet, Mohamed Boucadair, and
Yizhou Li contributed to an earlier version of
[I-D.you-i2nsf-user-group-based-policy]. We would like to thank the
authors of that draft on modern network access control mechanisms for
material that assisted in thinking about this document.
The authors would like to thank Joe Clarke, Bill Fenner, Benoit
Claise, Rob Wilton, David Somers-Harris, Alan Dekok, and Heikki
Vatiainen for their valuable comments and great input to this work.
Authors' Addresses
Qiufang Ma (editor)
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Jiangsu
210012
China
Email: maqiufang1@huawei.com
Qin Wu
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Jiangsu
210012
China
Email: bill.wu@huawei.com
Mohamed Boucadair (editor)
Orange
35000 Rennes
France
Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
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Daniel King
Lancaster University
United Kingdom
Email: d.king@lancaster.ac.uk
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