EAP Method Update D. Garcia-Carrillo
Internet-Draft University of Oviedo
Intended status: Standards Track R. Marin-Lopez
Expires: 4 September 2025 University of Murcia
G. Selander
J. Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
F. Lopez-Gomez
University of Murcia
3 March 2025
Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) with Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-ietf-emu-eap-edhoc-03
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748,
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. This document specifies the EAP authentication method EAP-
EDHOC, based on Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC). EDHOC is
a lightweight security handshake protocol, enabling authentication
and establishment of shared secret keys suitable in constrained
settings. This document also provides guidance on authentication and
authorization for EAP-EDHOC.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-eap-edhoc/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the EAP Method Update
mailing list (mailto:emu@ietf.org), which is archived at
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/dangarciacarrillo/i-d-eap-edhoc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. EDHOC Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Overview of the EAP-EDHOC Conversation . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Successful EAP-EDHOC Message Flow without
Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Transport and Message Correlation . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.4. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.6. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3. Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . . 17
3.5. EAP State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Detailed Description of the EAP-EDHOC Request and Response
Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1. EAP-EDHOC Request Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. EAP-EDHOC Response Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1. EAP Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry . . . . . . . 21
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1.1. EAP Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.1.2. EAP Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1.3. Additional Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2. Peer and Server Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.4. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.5. Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.6. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.8. Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.9. Cross-Protocol Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. This document specifies the EAP authentication method EAP-
EDHOC, which is based on the lightweight security handshake protocol
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) [RFC9528].
EAP-EDHOC is similar to EAP-TLS 1.3 [RFC9190], since EDHOC is based
on a similar security protocol design as the TLS 1.3 handshake
[RFC8446]. However, EDHOC has been optimized for highly constrained
settings, for example involving wirelessly connected battery powered
'things' with embedded microcontrollers, sensors, and actuators. An
overview of EDHOC is given in Section 1.1.
The EAP-EDHOC method enables the integration of EDHOC into different
applications and use cases using the EAP framework.
1.1. EDHOC Overview
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) is a lightweight
authenticated ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, including mutual
authentication and establishment of shared secret keying material,
see [RFC9528].
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EDHOC provides state-of-the-art security design at very low message
overhead, targeting low complexity implementations and allowing
extensibility. The security of EDHOC has been thoroughly analysed,
some references are provided in Section 9.1 of [RFC9528].
The main features of EDHOC are:
* Support for different authentication methods and credentials. The
authentication methods includes (mixed) signatures and static
Diffie-Hellman keys [RFC9528], and pre-shared keys
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc-psk]. A large and extensible variety of
authentication credentials is supported, including public key
certificates such as X.509 and C509
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], CBOR Web Tokens and CWT Claims
Sets [RFC8392].
* A standardized and extensible format for identification of
credentials, using COSE header parameters [RFC9052], supporting
credential transport by value or by reference, enabling very
compact representations.
* Crypto agility and secure ciphersuite negotiation, with predefined
compactly represented ciphersuites and support for extensibility
using the COSE algorithms registry [RFC9053].
* Selection of connection identifiers identifying a connection for
which keys are agreed.
* Support for integration of external security applications into
EDHOC by transporting External Authorization Data (EAD) included
in and protected as EDHOC messages.
A necessary condition for a successful completion of an EDHOC session
is that both peers support a common application profile including
method, ciphersuite, etc. More details are provided in
[I-D.ietf-lake-app-profiles].
EDHOC messages makes use of lightweight primitives, specifically CBOR
[RFC8949] and COSE [RFC9052] [RFC9053] for efficient encoding and
security services in constrained devices. EDHOC is optimized for use
of with CoAP [RFC7252] and OSCORE [RFC8613] to secure resource access
in constrained IoT use cases, but it is not bound to a particular
transport or communication security protocol.
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2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in EAP [RFC3748] and EDHOC [RFC9528].
3. Protocol Overview
3.1. Overview of the EAP-EDHOC Conversation
The EAP exchange involves three key entities: the EAP peer, the EAP
authenticator, and the EAP server. The EAP authenticator is a
network device that enforces access control and initiates the EAP
authentication process. The EAP peer is the device seeking network
access and communicates directly with the EAP authenticator. The EAP
server is responsible for selecting and implementing the
authentication methods and for authenticating the EAP peer. When the
EAP server is not located on a separate backend authentication
server, it is integrated into the EAP authenticator. For simplicity,
the operational flow diagrams in this document decipt only the EAP
peer and the EAP server.
The EDHOC protocol running between an Initiator and a Responder
consists of three mandatory messages (message_1, message_2,
message_3), an optional message_4, and an error message. In an EDHOC
session, EAP-EDHOC uses all messages including message_4, which is
mandatory and acts as a protected success indication.
After receiving an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC as
described in this document, the conversation will continue with the
EDHOC messages transported in the data fields of EAP-Response and
EAP-Request packets. When EAP-EDHOC is used, the formatting and
processing of EDHOC messages SHALL be done as specified in [RFC9528].
This document only lists additional and different requirements,
restrictions, and processing compared to [RFC9528].
The message processing in Section 5 of [RFC9528] states that certain
data (EAD items, connection identifiers, application algorithms,
etc.) is made available to the application. Since EAP-EDHOC is now
acting as the application of EDHOC, it may need to further this data
to complete the protocol. See also [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc-impl-cons].
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Resumption of EAP-EDHOC may be defined using the EDHOC-PSK
authentication method [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc-psk].
3.1.1. Successful EAP-EDHOC Message Flow without Fragmentation
EAP-EDHOC authentication credentials can be of any type supported by
COSE and be transported or referenced by EDHOC.
The optimization combining the execution of EDHOC with the first
subsequent OSCORE transaction specified in [RFC9668] is not supported
in this EAP method.
Figure 1 shows an example message flow for a successful execution of
EAP-EDHOC.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_4) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Success |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 1: EAP-EDHOC Message Flow
If the EAP-EDHOC peer authenticates successfully, the EAP-EDHOC
server MUST send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC
containing message_4 as a protected success indication.
If the EAP-EDHOC server authenticates successfully, and the EAP-EDHOC
peer achieves key confirmation by successfully verifying EDHOC
message_4, then the EAP-EDHOC peer MUST send an EAP-Response message
with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC containing no data. Finally, the EAP-EDHOC
server sends an EAP-Success.
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Note that the Identity request is optional [RFC3748] and might not be
used in systems like 3GPP 5G [Sec5G] where the identity is transfered
encrypted by other means before the EAP exchange. And while the EAP-
Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC and EAP-Success are mandatory [RFC3748]}
they do not contain any information and are might be encoded into
other system specific messages [Sec5G].
3.1.2. Transport and Message Correlation
EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer and can even be
used in environments without IP. Nonetheless, [RFC9528] provides a
set of requirements for a transport protocol to use with EDHOC.
These include: handling the loss, reordering, duplication,
correlation, and fragmentation of messages; demultiplexing EDHOC
messages from other types of messages; and denial-of-service
protection. All these requirements are fulfilled by the EAP
protocol, EAP method, or EAP lower layer, as specified in [RFC3748].
For message loss, this can be either fulfilled by the EAP layer, or
the EAP lower layer, or both.
For reordering, EAP relies on the EAP lower layer ordering
guarantees, for correct operation.
For duplication and message correlation, EAP has the Identifier
field, which allows both the EAP peer and EAP authenticator to detect
duplicates and match a request with a response.
Fragmentation is defined by this EAP method, see Section 3.1.6. The
EAP framework [RFC3748], specifies that EAP methods need to provide
fragmentation and reassembly if EAP packets can exceed the minimum
MTU of 1020 octets.
To demultiplex EDHOC messages from other types of messages, EAP
provides the Type field.
This method does not provide other mitigation against denial-of-
service than EAP [RFC3748].
3.1.3. Termination
Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5 illustrate message flows
in several cases where the EAP-EDHOC peer or EAP-EDHOC server sends
an EDHOC error message.
Figure 2 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
rejects message_1 with an EDHOC error message.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 2: EAP-EDHOC Server Rejection of message_1
Figure 3 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
authentication is unsuccessful and the EAP-EDHOC peer sends an EDHOC
error message.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 3: EAP-EDHOC Peer Rejection of message_2
Figure 4 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
authenticates to the EAP-EDHOC peer successfully, but the EAP-EDHOC
peer fails to authenticate to the EAP-EDHOC server, and the server
sends an EDHOC error message.
Note that the EDHOC error message may not be omitted. For example
with EDHOC ERR_CODE 3 "Unknown credential referenced" it is indicated
that the EDHOC peer should, for the next EDHOC session, try another
credential identifier supported according to the application profile.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 4: EAP-EDHOC Server Rejection of message_3
Figure 5 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
sends the EDHOC message_4 to the EAP peer, but the protected success
indication fails, and the peer sends an EDHOC error message.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_4) |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 5: EAP-EDHOC Peer Rejection of message_4
3.1.4. Identity
It is RECOMMENDED to use anonymous NAIs [RFC7542] in the Identity
Response, as such identities are routable and privacy-friendly.
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While opaque blobs are allowed by [RFC3748], such identities are NOT
RECOMMENDED as they are not routable and should only be considered in
local deployments where the EAP-EDHOC peer, EAP authenticator, and
EAP-EDHOC server all belong to the same network.
Many client certificates contain an identity such as an email
address, which is already in NAI format. When the certificate
contains an NAI as subject name or alternative subject name, an
anonymous NAI SHOULD be derived from the NAI in the certificate; See
Section 3.1.5.
3.1.5. Privacy
EAP-EDHOC peer and server implementations supporting EAP-EDHOC MUST
support anonymous Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) (Section 2.4 of
[RFC7542]). A node supporting EAP-EDHOC MUST NOT send its username
(or any other permanent identifiers) in cleartext in the Identity
Response (or any message used instead of the Identity Response).
Following [RFC7542], it is RECOMMENDED to omit the username (i.e.,
the NAI is @realm), but other constructions such as a fixed username
(e.g., anonymous@realm) or an encrypted username (e.g.,
xCZINCPTK5+7y81CrSYbPg+RKPE3OTrYLn4AQc4AC2U=@realm) are allowed.
Note that the NAI MUST be a UTF-8 string as defined by the grammar in
Section 2.2 of [RFC7542].
3.1.6. Fragmentation
EAP-EDHOC fragmentation support is provided through the addition of
flag bits (M and L) within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets,
as well as a (conditional) EAP-EDHOC Message Length field that can be
zero to four octets.
To do so, the EAP request and response messages of EAP-EDHOC have a
set of information fields that allow for the specification of the
fragmentation process (See Section 4 for the detailed description).
If the L bits are set, we are specifying that the message will be
fragmented and the length of the message, which is in the EAP-EDHOC
Message Length field.
Implementations MUST NOT set the L bit in unfragmented messages.
However, they MUST accept unfragmented messages regardless of whether
the L bit is set. Some EAP implementations and access networks
impose limits on the number of EAP packet exchanges that can be
processed. To minimize fragmentation, it is RECOMMENDED to use
compact EAP-EDHOC peer, EAP-EDHOC server, and trust anchor
authentication credentials, as well as to limit the length of
certificate chains. Additionally, mechanisms that reduce the size of
Certificate messages are RECOMMENDED.
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EDHOC is designed to perform well in constrained networks where
message sizes are restricted for performance reasons. When
credentials are passed by reference, EAP-EDHOC messages are typically
so small that fragmentation is not needed. However as EAP-EDHOC also
supports large X.509 certificate chains, EAP-EDHOC implementations
MUST provide support for fragmentation and reassembly. Since EAP is
a lock-step protocol, fragmentation support can be easily added.
EAP-EDHOC fragmentation support is provided through the addition of
two bits (L and M) within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets,
as well as an EDHOC Message Length field. The L field indicate the
length of the EDHOC Message Length field, which MUST be present for
the first fragment of a fragmented EDHOC message. The M flag bit is
set on all but the last fragment. The S flag bit is set only within
the EAP-EDHOC start message sent by the EAP server to the peer. The
EDHOC Message Length field provides the total length of the EDHOC
message that is being fragmented; this simplifies buffer allocation.
When an EAP-EDHOC peer receives an EAP-Request packet with the M bit
set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Response with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC and
no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP server MUST wait
until it receives the EAP-Response before sending another fragment.
To prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP server MUST
increment the Identifier field for each fragment contained within an
EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this Identifier value in the
fragment ACK contained within the EAP-Response. Retransmitted
fragments will contain the same Identifier value.
Similarly, when the EAP-EDHOC server receives an EAP-Response with
the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with EAP-Type=EAP-
EDHOC and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST
wait until it receives the EAP-Request before sending another
fragment. To prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP
server MUST increment the Identifier value for each fragment ACK
contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained within an EAP-
Response.
In the case where the EAP-EDHOC mutual authentication is successful,
and fragmentation is required, the conversation, illustrated in
Figure 6 will appear as follows:
EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
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| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start, S bit set) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2, Fragment 1, L and M bits set) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2, Fragment 2, M bit set) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2, Fragment 3) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3, Fragment 1, L and M bits set) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3, Fragment 2, M bit set) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3, Fragment 3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
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| EAP-Request/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_4) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Success |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 6: EAP-EDHOC Fragmentation Example
3.2. Identity Verification
The EAP peer identity provided in the EAP-Response/Identity is not
authenticated by EAP-EDHOC. Unauthenticated information MUST NOT be
used for accounting purposes or to give authorization. The EAP
authenticator and the EAP server MAY examine the identity presented
in EAP-Response/Identity for purposes such as routing and EAP method
selection. EAP-EDHOC servers MAY reject conversations if the
identity does not match their policy.
The EAP server identity in the EDHOC server certificate is typically
a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) in the SubjectAltName (SAN)
extension. Since EAP-EDHOC deployments may use more than one EAP
server, each with a different certificate, EAP peer implementations
SHOULD allow for the configuration of one or more trusted root
certificates (CA certificate) to authenticate the server certificate
and one or more server names to match against the SubjectAltName
(SAN) extension in the server certificate. If any of the configured
names match any of the names in the SAN extension, then the name
check passes. To simplify name matching, an EAP-EDHOC deployment can
assign a name to represent an authorized EAP server and EAP Server
certificates can include this name in the list of SANs for each
certificate that represents an EAP-EDHOC server. If server name
matching is not used, this degrades the confidence that the EAP
server with which the EAP peer is interacting is authoritative for
the given network. If name matching is not used with a public root
CA, then effectively any server can obtain a certificate that will be
trusted for EAP authentication by the peer.
The process of configuring a root CA certificate and a server name is
non-trivial; therefore, automated methods of provisioning are
RECOMMENDED. For example, the eduroam federation [RFC7593] provides
a Configuration Assistant Tool (CAT) to automate the configuration
process. In the absence of a trusted root CA certificate (user-
configured or system-wide), EAP peers MAY implement a Trust On First
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Use (TOFU) mechanism where the peer trusts and stores the server
certificate during the first connection attempt. The EAP peer
ensures that the server presents the same stored certificate on
subsequent interactions. The use of a TOFU mechanism does not allow
for the server certificate to change without out-of-band validation
of the certificate and is therefore not suitable for many deployments
including ones where multiple EAP servers are deployed for high
availability. TOFU mechanisms increase the susceptibility to traffic
interception attacks and should only be used if there are adequate
controls in place to mitigate this risk.
3.3. Key Hierarchy
The key derivation for EDHOC is described in Section 4 of [RFC9528].
The key material and Method-Id SHALL be derived from the PRK_exporter
using the EDHOC_Exporter interface, see Section 4.2.1 of [RFC9528].
Type is the value of the EAP Type field defined in Section 2 of
[RFC3748]. For EAP-EDHOC, Type has the value TBD1. The use of Type
as context enables the reuse of exporter labels across other future
EAP methods based on EDHOC.
Type = TBD1
MSK = EDHOC_Exporter(TBD2, << Type >>, 64)
EMSK = EDHOC_Exporter(TBD3, << Type >>, 64)
Method-Id = EDHOC_Exporter(TBD4, << Type >>, 64)
Session-Id = Type || Method-Id
Peer-Id = ID_CRED_I
Server-Id = ID_CRED_R
EAP-EDHOC exports the MSK and the EMSK and does not specify how it is
used by lower layers.
3.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements
The EAP-EDHOC peers and EAP-EDHOC servers MUST comply with the
compliance requirements (mandatory-to-implement cipher suites,
signature algorithms, key exchange algorithms, extensions, etc.)
defined in Section 8 of [RFC9528].
3.5. EAP State Machines
The EAP-EDHOC server sends message_4 in an EAP-Request as a protected
success result indication.
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EDHOC error messages SHOULD be considered failure result indication,
as defined in [RFC3748]. After sending or receiving an EDHOC error
message, the EAP-EDHOC server may only send an EAP-Failure. EDHOC
error messages are unprotected.
The keying material can be derived after the EDHOC message_2 has been
sent or received. Implementations following [RFC4137] can then set
the eapKeyData and aaaEapKeyData variables.
The keying material can be made available to lower layers and the EAP
authenticator after the protected success indication (message_4) has
been sent or received. Implementations following [RFC4137] can set
the eapKeyAvailable and aaaEapKeyAvailable variables.
4. Detailed Description of the EAP-EDHOC Request and Response Protocol
The EAP-EDHOC packet format for Requests and Responses is summarized
in Figure 7. Fields are transmitted from left to right. following a
structure inspired by the EAP-TLS packet format [RFC5216]. As
specified in Section 4.1 of [RFC3748], EAP Request and Response
packets consist of Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Type-Data
fields. The functions of the Code, Identifier, Length, and Type
fields are reiterated here for convenience. The EAP Type-Data field
consists of the R, S, M, L, EDHOC Message Length, and EDHOC Data
fields.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | R |S|M| L | EDHOC Message Length ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EDHOC Data ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: EAP-EDHOC Request and Response Packet Format
4.1. EAP-EDHOC Request Packet
Code: 1 (Request)
Identifier: The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching
responses with requests. The Identifier field MUST be changed on
each new (non-retransmission) Request packet, and MUST be the same
if a Request packet is retransmitted due to a timeout while
waiting for a Response.
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Length: The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and
Data fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should
be treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on
reception.
Type: TBD1 (EAP-EDHOC)
R: Implementations of this specification MUST set the R bits
(reserved) to zero and MUST ignore them on reception.
S: The S bit (EAP-EDHOC start) is set in an EAP-EDHOC Start message.
This differentiates the EAP-EDHOC Start message from a fragment
acknowledgement.
M: The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment.
I.e., when there is no fragmentation, it is set to zero.
L: The L field is the binary encoding of the size of the EDHOC
Message Length, in the range 0 byte to 4 bytes. All three bits
set to 0 indicates that the EDHOC Message Length field is not
present. If the first two bits of the L field are set to 0, and
the final bit is set to 1, then the size of the EDHOC Message
Length field is 1 byte, and so on.
EDHOC Message Length: The EDHOC Message Length field can have a size
of one to four octets and is present only if the L fild represent
a value greater than 0. This field provides the total length of
the EDHOC message that is being fragmented. When there is no
fragmentation it is not present.
EDHOC Data: The EDHOC data consists of the the whole or a fragment
of transported EDHOC message.
4.2. EAP-EDHOC Response Packet
Code: 2 (Response)
Identifier: The Identifier field is one octet and MUST match the
Identifier field from the corresponding request.
Length: The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and
Data fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should
be treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on
reception.
Type: TBD1 (EAP-EDHOC)
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R: Implementations of this specification MUST set the R bits
(reserved) to zero and MUST ignore them on reception.
S: The S bit (EAP-EDHOC start) is set to zero.
M: The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment.
I.e., when there is no fragmentation, it is set to zero.
L: The L field is the binary encoding of the size of the EDHOC
Message Length, in the range 0 byte to 4 bytes. All three bits
set to 0 indicates that the EDHOC Message Length field is not
present. If the first two bits of the L field are set to 0, and
the final bit is set to 1, then the size of the EDHOC Message
Length field is 1 byte, and so on.
EDHOC Message Length: The EDHOC Message Length field can have a size
of one to four octets and is present only if the L bits represent
a value greater than 0. This field provides the total length of
the EDHOC message that is being fragmented. When there is no
fragmentation it is not present.
EDHOC Data: The EDHOC data consists of the the whole or a fragment
of transported EDHOC message.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. EAP Type
IANA has registered the following new type in the "Method Types"
registry under the group name "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Registry":
Value: TBD1
Description: EAP-EDHOC
5.2. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry
IANA has registered the following new labels in the "EDHOC Exporter
Label" registry under the group name "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over
COSE (EDHOC)":
Label: TBD2
Description: MSK of EAP method EAP-EDHOC
Label: TBD3
Description: EMSK of EAP method EAP-EDHOC
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Label: TBD4
Description: Method-Id of EAP method EAP-EDHOC
The allocations have been updated to reference this document.
5.3. EDHOC External Authorization Data Registry
IANA has registered the following new label in the "EDHOC External
Authorization Data" registry under the group name "Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)":
Label: TBD5
Description: EAP channel binding information
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of EAP [RFC3748] and EDHOC [RFC9528]
apply to this document. Since the design of EAP-EDHOC closely
follows EAP-TLS 1.3 [RFC9190], many of its security considerations
are also relevant.
6.1. Security Claims
6.1.1. EAP Channel Binding
EAP-EDHOC allows the secure exchange of information between the
endpoints of the authentication process (i.e., the EAP peer and the
EAP server) using protected data fields. These fields can be used to
exchange EAP channel binding information, as defined in [RFC6677].
Section 6 in [RFC6677] outlines requirements for components
implementing channel binding information, all of which are satisfied
by EAP-EDHOC, including confidentiality and integrity protection.
Additionally, EAP-EDHOC supports fragmentation, allowing the
inclusion of additional information at the method level without
issues.
The channel binding protocol defined in [RFC6677] must be transported
after keying material has been derived between the endpoints in the
EAP communication and before the peer is exposed to potential adverse
effects from joining an adversarial network. Therefore, the EAD_3
and EAD_4 fields, transmitted in EDHOC message_3 and EDHOC message_4,
respectively, are perfect candidates for this purpose.
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If the server detects a consistency error in the channel binding
information contained in EAD_3, it will send a protected indication
of failed consistency in EAD_4. Subsequently, the EAP peer will
respond with the standard empty EAP-EDHOC message, and the EAP server
will conclude the exchange with an EAP-Failure message.
Accordingly, a new EAD item is defined to incorporate EAP channel
binding information into the EAD fields of the EAP-EDHOC messages:
* ead_label = TBD5
* ead_value is a CBOR byte string.
6.1.2. EAP Security Claims
EAP security claims are defined in Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748]. EAP-
EDHOC security claims are described next and summarized in Table 1.
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+==================+=======================================+
| Claim | |
+==================+=======================================+
| Auth. principle: | Certificates, CWTs and all credential |
| | types for which COSE header |
| | parameters are defined (1) |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Ciphersuite | Yes (2) |
| negotiation: | |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Mutual | Yes (3) |
| authentication: | |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Integrity | Yes (4) |
| protection: | |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Replay | Yes (5) |
| protection: | |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Confidentiality: | Yes (6) |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Key derivation: | Yes (7) |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Key strength: | The specified cryptosuites provide |
| | key strength of at least 128 bits. |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Dictionary | Yes (8) |
| attack prot.: | |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Fast reconnect: | No |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Crypt. binding: | N/A |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Session | Yes (9) |
| independence: | |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Fragmentation: | Yes (Section 3.1.6) |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
| Channel binding: | Yes (Section 6.1.1: EAD_3 and EAD_4 |
| | can be used to convey integrity- |
| | protected channel properties, such as |
| | network SSID or peer MAC address.) |
+------------------+---------------------------------------+
Table 1: EAP-EDHOC security claims
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* (1) Authentication principle: EAP-EDHOC establishes a shared
secret based on an authenticated ECDH key exchange. The key
exchange is authenticated using different kinds of credentials.
EAP-EDHOC supports EDHOC credential types. EDHOC supports all
credential types for which COSE header parameters are defined.
This include X.509 certificates [RFC9360], C509 certificates, CWTs
([RFC9528] Section 3.5.3.1) and CCSs ([RFC8392] Section 3.5.3.1).
* (2) Cipher suite negotiation: The Initiator's list of supported
cipher suites and order of preference is fixed, and the selected
cipher suite is the cipher suite that is most preferred by the
Initiator and that is supported by both the Initiator and the
Responder. EDHOC supports all signature algorithms defined by
COSE.
* (3) Mutual authentication: The initiator and responder
authenticate each other through the EDHOC exchange.
* (4) Integrity protection: EDHOC integrity protects all message
content using transcript hashes for key derivation and as
additional authenticated data, including, e.g., method type,
cipher suites, and external authorization data.
* (5) Replay protection. EDHOC broadens the message authentication
coverage to include algorithms, external authorization data, and
prior plaintext messages, as well as adding an explicit method
type. By doing this, an attacker cannot replay or inject messages
from a different EDHOC session.
* (6) Confidentiality. It is required that the encryption of
message_3 provides confidentiality against active attackers and
EDHOC message_4 relies on the use of authenticated encryption.
* (7) Key derivation. Except for MSK and EMSK, derived keys are not
exported. Key derivation is discussed in Section 3.3.
* (8) Dictionary attack protection. EAP-EDHOC provides Dictionary
attack protection.
* (9) Session independence. EDHOC generates computationally
independent keys derived from the ECDH shared secret.
6.1.3. Additional Security Claims
* (10) Cryptographic strength and Forward secrecy: Only ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman methods are supported by EDHOC, which ensures that
the compromise of a session key does not also compromise earlier
sessions' keys.
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* (11) Identity protection: EDHOC secures the Responder's credential
identifier against passive attacks and the Initiator's credential
identifier against active attacks. An active attacker can get the
credential identifier of the Responder by eavesdropping on the
destination address used for transporting message_1 and then
sending their own message_1.
6.2. Peer and Server Identities
The Peer-Id represents the identity to be used for access control and
accounting purposes. The Server-Id represents the identity of the
EAP server. The Peer-Id and Server-Id are determined from the
information provided in the credentials used.
ID_CRED_I and ID_CRED_R are used to identify the credentials of the
initiator (EAP peer) and Responder (EAP server). Therefore, for
Server-Id the ID_CRED_R is used, and for Peer-Id the ID_CRED_I is
used.
6.3. Certificate Validation
Same considerations as EAP-TLS1.3 Section 5.3 [RFC9190] apply here in
relation to the use of certificates.
When other types of credentials are used such as CWT/CCS, the
application needs to have a clear trust-establishment mechanism and
identify the pertinent trust anchors [RFC9528].
6.4. Certificate Revocation
Same considerations as EAP-TLS1.3 Section 5.4 [RFC9190] apply here in
relation to certificates.
When other types of credentials are used such as CWT/CCS, the
endpoints are in charge of handling revocation and confirming the
validity and integrity of CWT/CCS [RFC9528].
6.5. Packet Modification Attacks
EAP-EDHOC relies on EDHOC, which is designed to encrypt and integrity
protect as much information as possible. Any change is detected by
means of the transcript hashes integrity verification.
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6.6. Authorization
Following the considerations of EDHOC in appendix D.5 Unauthenticated
Operation [RFC9528], where EDHOC can be used without authentication
by allowing the Initiator or Responder to communicate with any
identity except its own.
When peer authentication is not used, EAP-EDHOC server
implementations MUST take care to limit network access appropriately
for authenticated peers. Authorization and accounting MUST be based
on authenticated information such as information in the certificate.
The requirements for Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) specified in
Section 4 of [RFC7542] apply and MUST be followed.
6.7. Privacy Considerations
Considerations in Section 9.6 of [RFC9528] against tracking of users
and eavesdropping on Identity Responses or certificates apply here.
Also, the considerations of Section 5.8 of [RFC9190] regarding
anonymous NAIs also applies.
6.8. Pervasive Monitoring
Considerations in Section 9.1 of [RFC9528] about pervasive monitoring
apply here.
6.9. Cross-Protocol Attacks
This in TLS1.3 is applied in the context of resumption. Does not
apply here.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3748>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7542>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9190] Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.
[RFC9528] Selander, G., Preuß Mattsson, J., and F. Palombini,
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", RFC 9528,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9528, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9528>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]
Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J., and
M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509
Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-12, 8 January 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
cbor-encoded-cert-12>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-app-profiles]
Tiloca, M. and R. Höglund, "Coordinating the Use of
Application Profiles for Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over
COSE (EDHOC)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-lake-app-profiles-01, 3 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-
app-profiles-01>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc-impl-cons]
Tiloca, M., "Implementation Considerations for Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-impl-cons-03, 3
March 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-lake-edhoc-impl-cons-03>.
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc-psk]
Lopez-Perez, Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., and R. Marin-
Lopez, "EDHOC Authenticated with Pre-Shred Keys (PSK)",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-
psk-03, 1 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lake-
edhoc-psk-03>.
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[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4137, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4137>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5216>.
[RFC6677] Hartman, S., Ed., Clancy, T., and K. Hoeper, "Channel-
Binding Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Methods", RFC 6677, DOI 10.17487/RFC6677, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6677>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.
[RFC7593] Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7593>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8392>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8613>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
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[RFC9053] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053>.
[RFC9360] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509
Certificates", RFC 9360, DOI 10.17487/RFC9360, February
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9360>.
[RFC9668] Palombini, F., Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Hristozov, S., and
G. Selander, "Using Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE
(EDHOC) with the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
and Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 9668, DOI 10.17487/RFC9668, November 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9668>.
[Sec5G] 3GPP TS 33 501, "Security architecture and procedures for
5G System", January 2025,
<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3169>.
Acknowledgments
The authors sincerely thank Eduardo Ingles-Sanchez for his
contribution in the initial phase of this work. We also want to
thank Marco Tiloca for his review.
This work was supported partially by grant PID2020-112675RB-C44
funded by MCIN/AEI/10.13039/5011000011033 (ONOFRE3-UMU).
This work was supported partially by Vinnova - the Swedish Agency for
Innovation Systems - through the EUREKA CELTIC-NEXT project CYPRESS.
Authors' Addresses
Dan Garcia-Carrillo
University of Oviedo
Gijon, Asturias 33203
Spain
Email: garciadan@uniovi.es
Rafael Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
Murcia 30100
Spain
Email: rafa@um.es
Garcia-Carrillo, et al. Expires 4 September 2025 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft EAP-EDHOC March 2025
Göran Selander
Ericsson
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Francisco Lopez-Gomez
University of Murcia
Murcia 30100
Spain
Email: francisco.lopezg@um.es
Garcia-Carrillo, et al. Expires 4 September 2025 [Page 30]